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Impressions on a
New Code of Ethics
by Professor William I. Weston

n January 1, 1987, members of the
Maryland Bar will be governed by
an entirely new code of ethics called
the MARYLAND RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Maryland Rule
1230 (1986). These rules are radically
changed both as to format and substance
from the ethical rules they replace.
After more than five years of study, research, review, hearings and drafting, the
Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards (often known as the Kutak Commission for its former chairman, the late
Robert Kutak, Esquire), recommended the
adoption of the MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Model
Rules) to the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association. This was not
the first time that the House had considered these rules. The first consideration by
the House occurred in February 1982
when a motion was approved by the House
replacing the former code with a draft of
the new Model Rules. Proposed final
drafts of the rules were considered at the
1982 Annual Meeting and at the 1983
Mid-Year Meeting. After debate and revision, the House voted to adopt the new
code, preamble, scope, terminology and
comments and on April 2, 1983, the new
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT were adopted by the House
of Delegates.
Since then, little more than a dozen states
have adopted the Model Rules including
Maryland. On April 15, 1986, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland ordered the adoption of the Model Rules after consideration of a favorable report by their own Select Committee to Study the ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. The effective date of the order is
January 1,1987.
The implementation of the Model Rules
on January 1, 1987 will result in changes
in the substantive rules which govern attorney conduct as well as the format by
which the rules are promulgated. Gone is
the tripartite system of canons, disciplinary
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rules and ethical considerations, the distinctions between which were never fully
understood and were often misapplied.
The tripartite system has been replaced
with a direct, black-letter approach in
which the standards of practice and conduct are written in language which is open
and direct. Each topic is considered in a
relatively unified fashion and the organizational format and numbering system are
less cumbersome than those of the tripartite
system. Thus, entry into the Model Rules
is not as forbidding and confusing as under
the former code.
Because the only applicable and enforceable language is contained in the rules
themselves, the aspirational and philosophical language is only reposed in the
commentaries where it rightfully belonged
all along. The text of the Model Rules
itself is authoritative and comprehensible.
The more than fifty rules in the Model
Rules are divided into eight substantive
categories each dealing with aspects of the
role of an attorney and the relationship of
that role to a variety of individuals and institutions. The groups are:
-the client-lawyer relationship
- the lawyer as a counselor
- the lawyer as advocate
- transactions with persons other than
clients
-law firms and associations
- public service
- information about legal services
- maintaining the integrity of the
profession

The Client-Lawyer Relationship
The greatest amount of consideration is
given to the client-lawyer relationship.
Every aspect of that relationship from attorney competence to terminating the relationship is considered. Many of the rules
in each of the eight sections are restatements or improved statements of the prior
rules. In addition to restating the existing
rules, the drafters also effectively com-

bined the substance of the canons, ethical
considerations and disciplinary rules to
produce a consistent, black letter statement
reflective of the prior rule.
There have been substantial changes in
the areas of fees, communication between
the attorney and the client, confidentiality
and attorney advertising/soliciting. It is interesting to note that the first Model Rule
is a statement on lawyer competence. Although largely a restatement of the concept
contained in MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
6-101(A)(1) (1980), the new rule is phrased
in the positive rather than suggesting
when an attorney ought not to handle the
matter. Moreover, Rule 1.1 specifically
defines the elements of competent representation by an attorney. The rule also envisions proper preparation by the attorney
as part of competent representation.
Rule 1.2(a) is a definitive statement of
what had previously been thought to be
the rule-that the client controls the substance of a case; the attorney the conduct.
But even as to the conduct of the case, the
attorney is directed to consult with his
or her client. Finally, the decision as to
whether or not to accept a settlement offer
or a plea bargain lies strictly with the
client. Although MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC
7-7 and 7-8 allowed the attorney to make
decisions as to some unspecified aspect of
the conduct of a case, the issue was not addressed as part of the disciplinary rules.
The clarification and codification of this
aspect of the attorney-client relationship is
a strong and positive step toward defining
the responsibility of the attorney toward
his or her client.
Rule 1.3 again, is a direct and clear statement as to the attorney's obligation to act
with diligence and promptness in a legal
matter. There is no similar counterpart in
the prior code although general language
in DR 6-101 has often been construed to
include diligence as part of the fiduciary
duty owed by an attorney to a client. DilaFa/~
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tory conduct by an attorney remains the
singular most frequent complaint raised
by clients.
Rule 1.4 takes another step toward establishing in clear language the parameters
of the attorney-client relationship and the
obligations owed by an attorney to his or
her client. As with Rule 1.3, the language
seems almost simplistic in requiring an attorney to keep a client reasonably informed
about the status of a matter and providing
reasonable explanations of the matter being handled by the attorney. Failure to
communicate as to the progress of the case
and as to the nature of the case represent
consistent complaints by clients. Rule 1.4
establishes a level of informed consent
analogous to that obligation owed by a
physician to his or her patient. Although
based on a different premise (the physician's duty is based on the right of each
person to hold his or her body inviolate
while the attorney's obligation is based on
the fiduciary relationship), the premise is
identical. The client, like the patient counterpart, makes the relevant decisions and
the professional is bound to satisfy the concept of materiality-providing sufficient
quantity and quality ofinformation for the
client to make the substantive decisions.

Attorney Fees
The subject of attorney's fees has undergone substantial clarification under the
Model Rules. Section 1.5 of the new rules
replaces the emphasis in the prior code on
illegal or excessive fees with a requirement
that fees shall be reasonable. Rather than a
cumbersome reliance on the definition of a
clearly excessive fee, attorneys can look to
the application of enumerated factors in
determining the reasonableness of a fee.
The second substantial change is the creation of a dichotomy between a new and a
former client with regard to the determination and explanation of an attorney's fee.
Under Section 1. 5(b) an attorney is required to tell the client the rate of the fee,
preferably in writing shortly after the commencement of the attorney-client relationship. The failure of attorneys in general to
reduce fee agreements to writing and to
discuss fees early in the relationship is an
issue of constant concern both to organizations which engage in arbitration of attorneys fees and to courts which are asked
to pass on the appropriateness of an attorney's fee. One would think that common sense would obviate the necessity for
this provision; but the failure of attorneys
to discuss fees with their clients and the
failure of attorneys to reduce parole fee
agreements to writing recurs.
As a further step toward written fee
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agreements, the new rules require contingent fee agreements to be in writing and
require that such an agreement set forth
the method by which the fee will be determined including the percentage to be
charged by the attorney from the ultimate
settlement, the fee involved in trial and/or
appeal, the costs to be deducted and when
such a deduction will take place and fmally,
the attorney is required to produce a written settlement statement in the case of a
contingent fee arrangement.

Failure to
communicate as to
the progress of the
case and as to the
nature of the case
represent consistent
complaints by clients.

Section (d) of the same provision prohibits fees which are contingent upon the
outcome in domestic relations cases. U nlike the prohibition against contingent fees
in criminal cases which was contained in
DR 2-106 (C), the similar prohibition in
domestic relations cases was referred to
obliquely in Ee 2-20. The wording of the
new section is curious in that the section
does not use language which is consistent
with section (d)(2) prohibiting contingent
fees in criminal cases. Rather, the lawyer is
not to charge a fee in a domestic relations
case which is contingent upon the securing
of a divorce or the amount ofalimony, support or property distribution. Because
there is no res as in a personal injury action
from which the fee could be taken and because the role of the lawyer in a domestic
relations case is quite different, there are
legitimate concerns about any fee which
appears to be result oriented.
The attorney in a domestic relations
matter is dealing with issues as to the future welfare of the parties he or she is representing. While there are economic consequences involved in domestic relations,
the framers of the Model Rules expect the
attorney to go beyond the purely economic
issues involved in obtaining a particular
result to the human issues of dealing with
the needs of the client. One of the strongest basis upon which property and alimony
are awarded is the need of the party re-

questing the award, such as, emotional
needs, physical needs and economic needs.
Thus, the attorney is restrained from using
a result orientation in setting a fee for a
domestic relations client.
The final change with regard to fees concerns the division of fees. A fee may be divided between attorneys not in the same
firm if the client is advised of the arrangement, consents to it, and the two attorneys
either divide the work or share the responsibility; and the total fee is reasonable for
the work performed by both attorneys.
Under the former code both actual work
and responsibility were required before a
fee could be divided; the model rules allows division if either occurs. The continued receipt and payment of referral fees
by attorneys without satisfying the requirements of either the new section or its predecessor is a recurring problem. There is a
myth among attorneys that when one refers a case, that gratuitous act, performed
in the best interests of the client, warrants
the payment of a referral or finders fee by
the second attorney. In most cases, the first
attorney has done nothing more than what
he or she is ethically obligated to do. It has
always been the rule that in order to collect
a fee from a client, the attorney must assume some responsibility for the conduct
of the case. To collect a fee for referral
absent either work or responsibility or
both is by definition unreasonable and
should not be part of the popular conduct
of attorneys.

Client Confidentiality
Rule 1.6 deals with confidentiality where
several changes were made to the prior
model code section dealing with confidentiality (DR 4-lO1). The first change is
the elimination of the secrets/confidences
dichotomy in the old code. The distinction
between these tWo was poorly defined and
the two were often combined when evaluating attorney conduct. The Model Rules
require that an attorney not reveal information relating to the representation of the
client. In the comments, the attorney is reminded of his or her duty to hold inviolate
confidential information of the client. The
Model Rules broadens the prior code by
creating an umbrella ofinformation which
deals with the representation of the client
rather than creating pidgeonholes in the
form of confidences and secrets in which
the attorney must fit the data obtained.
The new rule is also broader in that the
source of the protected information is deemphasized in favor of the umbrella ofinformation theory mentioned above.
The process by which, and the informa-

tion which an attorney may reveal have
also undergone substantial change in the
new rules. The prior provision which allowed an attorney to reveal information in
order to collect a fee has been broadened to
include any claim or defense in a controversy between the attorney and client. The
provision which allowed (mandated) that
an attorney reveal an intention of the client
to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime has been
substantially changed. Under the Model
Rules, the attorney may reveal information to prevent the client from committing
a criminal act likely to result in imminent
death or substantial bodily harm. Maryland has added language which was contained in the original Kutak report which
requires an attorney to reveal information
to prevent a client from committing a
criminal or fraudulent act which is likely to
result in substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another; in addition to the lawyer's duty to reveal information to prevent bodily harm. The attorney
is also obligated in Maryland to rectify the
consequences of the client's criminal or
fraudulent act in which the attorney's services were used. Finally, an attorney is
mandated to comply with the confidentiality rules, a court order or other law.
The latter statement (Subsection (b)(4))
is redundant in light of the adoption of the
rules by the court ofappeals which thereby
mandates compliance. As an officer of the
court, an attorney is already obligated to
comply with a court order or "other law".
The purpose and necessity of this latter
provision is unclear. The application of
the rectification provision is very unclear
and will require substantial explanation by
bar associations and the courts. Moreover,
there is absolutely no guidance as to adequacy and degree of rectification which
will satisfy an attorney's obligation.
The final problem with Maryland's version of the Model Rule 1.6 concerns the
extension of the attorney's duty to reveal
information beyond bodily harm and death
to financial and property injuries. The
comments adopted by the court of appeals
are little more than a carbon copy of the
comments provided in the ABA version of
the rules. No guidance is given to explain
the type of fraudulent act sufficient to warrant disclosure and/or rectification. Must
the domestic relations attorney who is told
by his client of the potential sale of a pi~ce
of allegedly marital property reveal the
potential sale? What if the offer to buy occurred in a social setting and was not followed by documents? Finally, what definition and standard of fraud will be legally
sufficient in the application of this rule in
a day to day setting? This extension by

Maryland is a poorly drafted and conceived excursion in uncharted waters
where the hazards are as much illusory as
real.

Conflicts of Interest
Sections 1. 7-1.10 deal with conflicts of
interest situations. Section 1.8 (e)(l) is different from the prior code in that a client
need not remain ultimately liable for all
expenses advanced by the attorney. Sec-

.. . the attorney may
reveal information
to prevent the client
from committing a
criminal act likely to
result in imminent
or substantial bodily
harm.
tion 1. 9 is new to the rules and the closest
counterpart in the old code is the provision
requiring that an attorney avoid even the
appearance of impropriety. This rule abandons the impropriety approach in favor of
approaching conflicts in a substantive manner. Where an attorney has represented a
client, he cannot represent another person
in the same matter involving adverse interests to the former client without consent of
the latter. The attorney is further prohibited from using information which
would disadvantage the former client.
Section 1.13 codifies the provisions of
EC 5-8 which indicated that an attorney
represents the entity and not the persons
connected with the entity. The section
clarifies the relationship of the officers and
directors to the corporation and allows for
dual representation of the entity and directors, officers, employees, members and
shareholders if there is no conflict ofinterest. The substance of this section is directed to the issue of conflicts of interest
rather than the concern of the code which
was interference in independent professional judgment.

Attorney Dilatory Conduct
Rule 3.2 clarifies the prior code section
(DR 7-102 (A)(l)) by mandating that an
attorney take appropriate steps consistent
with the interests of the client to expedite

litigation. Dilatory conduct by attorneys is
a recurring problem and the subject of
consistent complaints by clients. Although
delay can occur for a variety of reasons
many of which have nothing to do with the
conduct of the attorney, failure on the part
of an attorney to move the case forward is
an all-to frequent occurrence. The language
of the new rule shifts the obligation from
the negative to the positive by obligating
the attorney to take steps to expedite rather
than prohibiting an attorney from acting
in such a way as to delay.

False Evidence
Rule 3.3 takes substantial steps to prevent the introduction of fraudulent testimony and goes further than the prior code
in obligating the attorney to take appropriate steps to correct the situation when he
becomes aware of the fraud or the falsity of
evidence. This provision and its ancillary
sections in Rule 3 clearly require candor
and require the attorney take appropriate
steps to insure candor. The attorney is
even required, in Rule 3.3 to reveal all material relevant facts in an ex parte proceeding whether or not they are adverse. Rule
3.4 adds the requirement of candor in the
conduct of discovery so as to avoid frivolous
discovery actions and to avoid unreasonable delay as to the conduct of discovery.

Trial Publicity
Rule 3.6 dealing with trial publicity is
substantially changed from its predecessor
section (DR 7-107) in format and in degree
of specificity. The new rule also adopts as
a test in trial publicity a new standard:
"substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding." The
new rule eliminates the ponderous distinctions between types of proceedings in the
former code and replaces the language
with a clear statement as to the obligations
of an attorney and indirectly reinforces an
attorney's obligations as an officer of the
court despite his or her duty to zealously
represent a client.

Attorney Advertising
The final area in which there has been
substantial departure from the predecessor
code is advertising. The prior section
DR 2-101 was promulgated as a reluctant
reaction to the Supreme Court decision of
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S.
350 (1977). Prohibitions against advertising date back to the American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics of
1908. The ABA Canons were a redraft of
the Alabama Code of Ethics which was
FaJ~ 1986rrhe Law Forum-33

adopted in 1887 and which also contained
the prohibition against advertising by attorneys. The theory behind the prohibition
was a combination of a desire for professionalism and dignity among lawyers and
as a means of avoiding all-out competition
among attorneys. Word of mouth was considered the most effective advertising and
if there was to be any advertising, it was
limited to providing a notice of location
and existence of the law office through
very limited mechanisms such as business
cards, directory advertising and recognized
law lists.
The milieu in which the original ban on
advertising was promulgated became increasingly obsolete. Attorneys practiced in
a mercantile and competitive atmosphere
rather than the rarified atmosphere of the
"noble profession". Moreover, bar associations became zealous in their enforcement of the ban on advertising to the point
of absurdity. Attorneys, for example, were
prohibited from placing a name and message in a local booster newspaper. Instead
they were told they had to place the advertisement anonymously. The Bates decision
was an example of the Supreme Court acting for the profession when the profession
refused to take a more reasoned course.
The resulting Model Rules provisions and
the progeny of the Bates decision have effected a practice area in which just about
anything goes. Only statements which are
misleading or false or contain a material
misrepresentation of fact or law, which
create unjustified expectations as to results
or which compare one lawyer to another
are proscribed. The advertising attorney is
required under Section 7.2 to keep a copy
of advertisements for two years (instead of
an indefinite period under the prior code)
and attorney advertising must list the name
of at least one attorney responsible for the
content of the advertisement. The abolition of the list of approved advertisement
vehicles (DR 2-101 (B)(1-25» is the final
step toward the elimination of any constraints as to the type of advertisement and

the medium chosen and the complete disavowal of the dignity of the profession approach contained in all of the prior versions of the code. Advertising which runs
the gamut from shopping carts in grocery
stores to television videos, that meets the
limitations contained in Model Rule 7.1,
is permitted. The payment of value for the
recommendation of an attorney's services
(other, of course than by another attorney)
is still prohibited, thereby retaining the
historical prohibitions against the use of a
paid "runner" to find cases.
The prohibition against soliciting is retained in Model Rule 7.3 although the
exceptions have been defined a bit more
clearly than they were in DR 2-104. The
new rule also prohibits the attorney from
taking advantage of a person who is physically or emotionally incapable of exercising independent judgment and the provisions prohibit the attorney from employing
coercion, duress or harrassment in contacting a prospective client. The validity of
Model Rule 7.3 has been thrown into
doubt by a series of cases before the V.S.
Supreme Court in which the Court allowed
advertising directed either to a specific
type of client (Dalkon Shield plaintiffs:
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel
105 S.Ct. 2265 (1985); or to a specific
client (direct mail solicitation to the victims and families of the Hyatt-Regency
skywalk accident: Matter of Von Wiegen,
63 N.Y. 2d 163,470 N.E. 2d 838 (1984),
cert. denied 105 S.Ct. 2701 (1985». One
jurisdiction has upheld the regulation of
electronic media advertising. Iowa's rules
expressly prohibit television advertisements which contain background sounds
and effects other than a single voice in a
non-dramatic state. The Iowa Supreme
Court in Committee on Professional Ethics v.
Humphrey 355 N.W. 2d 565 (Iowa 1984),
vacated, 105 S.Ct. 2693 (1985), upheld the
restrictive rules on the basis that this type
of advertising presented different and unusual problems. After the Supreme Court
decision in Zauderer, the Iowa decision
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was vacated and remanded. In a second
opinion after remand, the Iowa Supreme
Court adhered to its former position in
Committee on Professional Ethics v. Humphrey, 377 N.W. 2d 643 (Iowa 1985), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 1626 (1986). The
Iowa Supreme Court based its decision on
the unique nature of the advertisement on
television which does not afford the viewer
time for contemplation or analysis but
rather appeals to emotional and instinctive
reactions. The V.S. Supreme Court dismissed an appeal in the case for lack of a
substantial federal question. Humphrey v.
Committee on Professional Ethics 106 S.Ct.
1626 (1986).

Conclusion
The full impact of the Model Rules will
not be realized for some years as bar associations, courts and grievance commissions
grapple with the plain meaning of the
words contained in the rules. The quantum jump in attorney malpractice litigation will result in further evaluation of the
standards set forth in the Model Rules.
Even if the Model Rules result in no less
litigation, no fewer ethics opinions or disciplinary proceedings, they will be a positive addition to the evaluation of attorney
conduct because of their clarity, conciseness and organization.
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